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Parties to the Appeal
The parties to the appeal are Appellant Walter Michael Andrus, as Trustee of the
Mary Elizabeth Andrus Nevada Trust, and Appellee Rebekah Andrus.
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Jurisdictional Statement
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
section 78A-4-103(2)(j).
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Statement of Issues and Standard of Review
The issues on appeal include:
a) Whether the District Court erred in granting partial summary judgment for the
Appellee and denying summary judgment in favor of the Appellant where the Appellant
(acting as the court-appointed guardian of an incapacitated person, during the term of
incapacity, and prior to the death of the incapacitated person) executed a change of
beneficiary form on the incapacitated person's term life insurance policy reducing the
Appellee's share of the benefits of the life insurance policy and instead directing a share
of the proceeds to a trust for the incapacitated person's minor daughter, and
b) Whether the District Court erred in granting partial summary judgment for the
Appellee by relying on disputed issues of material fact, where counsel for the Appellee
referenced disputed material facts in his memoranda and his oral argument at the motion
hearing, including references to the transcript of a deposition of Appellant which
Appellant was not allowed to review, correct, or sign.
These issues were preserved for appeal in the Appellant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Interpleader Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, and Appellant's oral argument at the hearing on the parties'
Motions for Summary Judgment (Original Transcript for Hearing dated 9/1/09).
The applicable standard of appellate review is correctness: whether the trial court
correctly interpreted and applied the law to the undisputed facts.
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Constitutional or Statutory Provisions
Utah Code section 75-5-312(2)
Utah Code section 31A-22-413(2)
Statement of the Case
This appeal is from an Order of the Fifth District Court in and for Washington
County, case no. 0805001087, entered on September 30, 2009, which granted partial
summary judgment for the Appellee and denied the Appellant's Motion for Summary
Judgment. The Fifth District Court certified the Order as a final judgment pursuant to
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on December 9, 2009.
On appeal, the Appellant seeks reversal of the Order granting partial summary
judgment for the Appellee. The Appellant seeks entry of summary judgment in favor of
the Appellant or remand to the trial court for further proceedings or a trial of the disputed
material facts.
Statement of Facts
In the trial court, Plaintiff/Appellant Mike Andrus asserted that the following
facts, supported by the Exhibits attached to Plaintiff/Appellant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Interpleader Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (which is
hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiffs Memorandum"), were materially relevant and
undisputed:
1. On about August 17, 2001, Mike Andrus5 son, Jared Andrus, purchased a term life
insurance policy, No. 15843524 (hereinafter "the life insurance policy" or "the
policy"), with a death benefit of $500,000 and no cash value, from Northwestern
4

Mutual Life Insurance Company.

See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 1,

Affidavit of Walter Michael Andrus, 12; Exhibit 2, Life Insurance Policy.
2. At the time of the purchase, Jared Andrus designated his wife, Rebekah Andrus, as
the sole beneficiary of the life insurance policy's death benefit. See Plaintiffs
Memorandum, Exhibit 2.
3. In 2007, Jared Andrus became seriously ill with cancer.

See Plaintiffs

Memorandum, Exhibit 1,1f 4.
4. Due to his illness and his concerns over the immaturity and instability of his wife,
Rebekah Andrus, Jared Andrus asked his father, Mike Andrus, if he would be
willing to serve as Jared5 s guardian if Jared became incapacitated. See Plaintiffs
Memorandum, Exhibit 1, *[J 5.
5. Prior to the guardianship appointment, Jared Andrus informed Mike Andrus of the
existence of the life insurance policy and expressed his desire that, should Jared
die from the cancer, the insurance proceeds should be used to provide a secure
future, including a college education and financial independence, for his young
daughter, Mary Elizabeth Andrus, and that the funds not be wasted on mundane
living expenses. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 1,^6.
6. Prior to the guardianship appointment, Jared Andrus also told Mike Andrus that,
due to Rebekah Andrus5 mental and emotional instability, he could not rely on her
to responsibly provide for their daughter's financial security.
Memorandum, Exhibit 1,^7.
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See Plaintiffs

7. On June 15, 2007, Jared Andrus filed a Petition for Guardianship of an
Incapacitated Person with the Utah Fifth District Court, asking the Court to
appoint his father, Mike Andrus, as his legal guardian, on the grounds that Jared
Andrus was suffering from cancer and that "his illness . . . caused [him] to lack
sufficient understanding and capacity to make and communicate responsible
decisions." See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 3, Petition for Guardianship.
8. On June 18, 2007, Mike Andrus took Jared Andrus, who was living with him at
the time, to a session of chemotherapy treatment for this cancer. When they
arrived, the nurse informed them that only one person could stay with Jared during
the session, so Mike Andrus, at Jared's request, called Jared's wife, Rebekah
Andrus, who was supposed to meet them there. Mike Andrus gave her Jared's
messages, telling her that Jared wanted Mike to stay with him and that Rebekah
did not need to come to the session. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 1,^9.
9. On that date, after Jared completed a difficult eight hours of treatment, Mike
Andrus drove him home. On the way home, Jared called Rebekah to let her know
how things were going. During the conversation, which Mike Andrus could hear
because Jared had the cell phone on speaker phone mode, Rebekah became upset
with Jared and told him that she was putting him out of her life for her own wellbeing. She also told him that she did not like being treated like a criminal in that
she did not want her visits with him (at Mike Andrus' house) to be monitored (as
Jared had requested that he not be left alone with her). When Mike Andrus heard
her make this cruel and selfish statements, Mike took the phone, told her, "This is
6

why" (meaning Tared did not want to be alone with her because of the way she
was treating him), and hung up the phone. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit
1, U 10; Exhibit 4, pgs. 2-3.
10. On that date, shortly after Mike Andrus and Tared Andrus arrived at Mike's home,
Rebekah Andrus' brother-in-law arrived at the home, stood in the driveway, and
repeatedly attempted to call Mike Andrus and verbally harass him. After the man
left, Mike Andrus called the police, who came to take a report on the incident.
Mike Andrus watched Tared fill out a witness statement for the police in which
Tared expressed his concerns about Rebekah Andrus and related the incidents of
that day. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 1, ^f 11; Exhibit 4.
11. Tared Andrus' witness statement to the police states: "Rebekah and I have had a
difficult marriage. Her behavior matches a condition called paranoid personality
disorder. My father and I [agreed], and Rebekah agreed also, that to prevent and
stop her behavior that has caused me extreme stress and anxiety and interfered
with my healing in many ways including causing insomnia and adrenalin highs[,]
her visits and conversations with me would be monitored."

See Plaintiffs

Memorandum, Exhibit 4, pg. 2.
12. Tared Andrus' witness statement also states: "Rebekah said in response [to his
request that her visits to him be short and earlier in the day] that she has put me
out of her life so that she can function. Then she expressed unhappiness at our
visits being monitored and being treated like a common criminal when she is here
at my father's home." See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 4., pg. 3.
7

13. Jared Andrus5 witness statement further reads: "I want to be here at my father's
home with him and Ruth caring for me. I want to continue to do so. I have
expressed this to Rebekah. I do not want to go home or anywhere else." See
Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 4, pg. 4.
14. On July 10, 2007, in Jared's guardianship case, Judge Shumate, of the Utah Fifth
District Court, entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, which
ordered that Mike Andrus was appointed as the legal guardian of Jared Andrus.
See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 5, Findings of Fact.
15. The Order contains a finding that the "Petitioner's spouse, Rebekah Andrus, is
disqualified from serving as guardian on the grounds that the Petitioner has
previously nominated Michael Andrus to serve as his guardian and that Rebekah
Andrus is mentally, physically, emotionally, and financially incapable of serving
as the guardian of the Petitioner." See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 5, \ 15.
16. On July 10, 2007, the Fifth District Court also issued a Letter of Guardianship,
verifying that Mike Andrus was appointed as his son's guardian and that Mike
Andrus5 authority included "all the powers, authorities, rights, and responsibilities
of full

legal guardianship of Jared Michael Andrus."

See

Plaintiffs

Memorandum, Exhibit 6, Letter of Guardianship.
17. On July 17, 2007, Mike Andrus, as "full legal guardian of Jared Michael Andrus,"
executed a Northwestern Mutual form entitled "Designation of Beneficiaries by
Owner For Death Proceeds Only" (hereinafter "the beneficiary change form"),
which designated Jared's wife, Rebekah Andrus, as the beneficiary of 15% of the
8

life insurance policy proceeds and the Mary Elizabeth Andrus Nevada Trust as the
beneficiary of 85% of the life insurance proceeds. See Plaintiffs Memorandum,
Exhibit 7, Designation of Beneficiaries Form.
18. On July 19, 2007, Mike Andrus, acting as Jared Andrus' guardian, executed a trust
agreement, entitled "Mary Elizabeth Andrus Nevada Trust," for the purpose of
holding "[a]ny and all payments due the trust . . . from any life insurance owned
by Jared Michael Andrus" for the benefit of Mary Elizabeth Andrus, the minor
daughter of Jared and Rebekah Andrus. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 8,
Mary Elizabeth Andrus Nevada Trust Agreement; Plaintiffs Memorandum,
Exhibit 1,113.
19. On December 23, 2007, Jared Andrus passed away. See Plaintiffs Memorandum,
Exhibit 1,117.
20. In early January 2008, Mike Andrus submitted the beneficiary change form to
Northwestern Mutual. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 1,118.
21. Upon Northwestern Mutual's refusal to pay the death benefit, Mike Andrus
brought this legal action, as Trustee of the Mary Elizabeth Andrus Nevada Trust,
in order to secure 85% of the policy proceeds in the Trust for the benefit of his
young granddaughter, Mary Elizabeth Andrus, so that the proceeds would not be
wasted by Rebekah Andrus and so that Mary will be ensured a college education
and a secure financial future. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 1,119.
22. At all times, while acting as Jared Andrus' guardian—in changing the life
insurance beneficiary designation and setting up the trust for Mary Elizabeth
9

Andrus—Mike Andrus believed he was acting in complete accordance with
Jared's expressed desires, for the benefit of Mary Elizabeth Andrus, and in the
best interests of Jared Andrus. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 1,1f 20.
23. Mike Andrus did not receive, and never expected to receive, any compensation for
his appointment and work as guardian of Jared Andrus.

See Plaintiffs

Memorandum, Exhibit 1, f 21.
24. Mike Andrus, for his services in acting as Trustee of the Mary Elizabeth Andrus
Nevada Trust, does not intend to receive any compensation from the proceeds of
the policy at issue in this case and intends that all proceeds payable to the Trust
will go to Mary's benefit. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Exhibit 1,1f 22.
25.In September 2008, Northwestern Mutual stipulated that it was unable to
determine who was entitled to the life insurance policy proceeds and that it had no
interest in the proceeds.
26. Pursuant to the stipulation, Northwestern Mutual deposited the $500,000 death
benefit, plus interest, with this Court and was dismissed from this action with
prejudice.
27.Rebekah Andrus' undisputed 15% of the proceeds has been paid to her, with
interest.
Summary of Argument
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Appellee Rebekah Andrus
because, on the undisputed material facts, as a matter of law, Appellant Mike Andrus, as
Jared's court-appointed guardian, was acting within his authority as guardian when he
10

executed a change of beneficiary form on July 17, 2007, making the Mary Elizabeth
Andrus Nevada Trust, created for the benefit of Jared5s daughter, the beneficiary of 85%
of the policy proceeds. The trial court should have ruled that, as a matter of law, the
beneficiary change was enforceable and granted summary judgment in favor of the
Plaintiff/Appellant.
The trial court may also have erred by granting summary judgment for Appellee
based on disputed material facts. In his memoranda related to summary judgment and in
oral argument at the hearing on the motions for summary judge, counsel for Appellee
made multiple references to a deposition of Appellant Mike Andrus. Counsel for the
Appellant objecled, both in his memorandum and at oral argument, to the references to
the deposition on the grounds that Appellant Andrus was promised that he would be
allowed to review and correct the deposition before signing it but then was not allowed to
do so and never signed it. As the trial court did not make specific findings of the
undisputed material facts upon which it relied in granting partial summary judgment for
the Appellee, the judgment should be reversed and remanded for the entry of such facts
or for trial on the disputed facts.
Argument
The trial court should have granted summary judgment for the Plaintiff/Appellant
on the grounds that, on the undisputed facts detailed above, Mike Andrus had authority,
as Jared Andrus5 court-appointed guardian, to change the beneficiary designation of
Jared5s policy.

Because Mike Andrus, acting as Jared5s lawful guardian, properly

executed the beneficiary change form and submitted it in a timely manner, Rebecca
11

Andrus is only entitled to 15% of the proceeds, which have already been paid to her, and
the remainder should be paid to the Mary Elizabeth Andrus Nevada Trust for the benefit
of Jared and Rebecca's minor child, Mary Elizabeth Andrus.
I. Under the Utah Code, the authority that may be granted to a court-appointed
guardian of an incapacitated person is broad enough to allow the guardian to
change a life insurance beneficiary designation.
A.

Utah Code section 75-5-312(2) allows broad powers to court-appointed

guardians.
Appellant/Plaintiff Mike Andrus (hereinafter generally referred to as "Appellant")
asserts that, under Utah law, unless specifically limited by the appointing court, a courtappointed guardian of an incapacitated person has authority to change a life insurance
beneficiary designation. Utah's statutory scheme is broad and allows the appointing
court to entrust the guardian with full authority to act on behalf of the incapacitated ward.
Utah Code section 75-5-312(2) defines the powers of a guardian as follows:
Absent a specific limitation on the guardian's power in the order of
appointment, the guardian has the same powers, rights, and duties respecting
the ward that a parent has respecting the parent's unemancipated minor child
except that a guardian is not liable to third persons for acts of the ward solely
by reason of the parental relationship.
When one considers the authority and rights that a parent has with regard to his or her
minor child, it is clear that the Utah Legislature has expressly made the authority of a
court-appointed guardian, unless limited by the appointing court, very broad.
The Utah Supreme Court has affirmed the broad scope of powers which may be
granted to a court appointed guardian. In the case of In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah
12

1981), emphasizing that the trial court has authority to limit the scope of guardianship at
the time of appointment, the court wrote:
Although the powers conferred upon a guardian may be very broad, the court
is authorized to tailor the powers of a guardian to the specific needs of the
ward. In appointing a guardian, the court should state with particularity the
powers granted, unless the full scope of the statutory authorization is
warranted.
Id. at 1091 (emphasis added).
Assuming that the appointing court has not limited the guardian's powers, Utah
Code section 75-5-312(2) sets up this practical test for determining whether or not a
guardian's act falls within the scope of his authority as guardian: Does a parent have
authority to take such an action on behalf of the parent's minor child? Or, as specifically
applied to the present case: Does a parent have authority to change the beneficiary of a
minor child's life insurance policy? The answer to this test is straightforward in the
present case: The parent must use the correct form and submit the form in a timely
manner, but nothing in Utah law limits a parent's authority to change his or her child's
life insurance beneficiary.

Thus, under section 75-5-312(2) the authority that an

appointing court may authorize to a guardian includes the authority to change a life
insurance policy beneficiary.
It is also important to note that Utah Code section 75-5-312(2) does not place any
further limitations on a guardian's authority. The second sentence of section 75-5-312(2)
does impose certain duties on the guardian, such as caring for the ward and his property,
but it specifically states that the rights and duties are listed "without qualifying" the broad
grant of authority stated in the first sentence of the section.
13

Finally, it is good public policy to allow a guardian, if not prohibited by the
appointing court for good cause, to execute beneficiary changes on the incapacitated
person's insurance policy.

This allows the guardian to take present conditions into

account and effectuate the known wishes of the incapacitated person, for the best interest
of the incapacitated person. That is exactly what happened in the present case, where the
guardian changed the beneficiary in order to preserve the insurance proceeds for the
benefit of Jared Andrus' young daughter and to prevent the proceeds from being wasted
by Appellee Rebekah Andrus, who was deemed unfit to be Jared's guardian by the
appointing court.
B.

Andrus v. Blazzard can be distinguished from the present case.

Interpleader Plaintiff/Appellee Rebekah Andrus (hereinafter generally referred to
as "Appellee") argued in the lower courts that Andrus v. Blazzard, 63 P. 888 (Utah 1901),
supports her argument that a guardian lacks authority to change a beneficiary designation.
However, the facts and legal issues in Andrus are much different from the present case
and thus Andrus is neither controlling nor persuasive.
Andrus v. Blazzard can be distinguished from the present case in several ways.
First, in Andrus, the guardian attempted to enter into a contract on behalf of the ward. In
the present case, the ward, Jared Andrus, had entered into a contract, an insurance policy,
prior to the guardianship. Mike Andrus, as guardian of Jared Andrus, did not attempt to
contract on Jared's behalf. Instead, acting as guardian and in Jared's best interest, Mike
Andrus exercised a personal option that was allowed by the policy to change the policy's
beneficiary.
14

Second, the issue in Andrus was whether the guardian or the ward was liable on
the contract. This issue does not exist in the present case, as Jared Andrus fulfilled his
obligations on the contract by paying his insurance premiums and Mike Andrus was not
seeking to impose a contractual financial burden on his ward.
Given these significant factual and legal differences between Andrus and the
present case, this court should conclude that Andrus gives no practical guidance in
applying Utah Code section 75-5-312(2).
C.

This is an issue of first impression in Utah,

Counsel for Mike Andrus has researched Utah's appellate case law and can find
no relevant cases to assist the Court on this issue. Since the issue of whether a guardian
can change the beneficiary of a ward's insurance policy is one of first impression in Utah,
it is fortunate that the plain language of section 75-5-312(2) is clear enough for the Court
to conclude that, just as a parent is not legally prohibited from changing the beneficiary
of a minor child's insurance policy, a guardian with full guardianship authority is also not
prohibited from making such a change.
D,

The insurance proceeds are not part of Jared Andrus5 estate and thus

conservatorship law does not apply.
Appellee previously asserted in the lower courts that the insurance policy should
have been included in Jared Andrus' estate. Appellee thus attempts to impose the
requirements of a conservator on Mike Andrus, on the theory that the $500,000 death
benefit would have necessitated the appointment of a conservator, in addition to a
guardian.
15

Appellee's theory is incorrect, because Jared Andrus' insurance policy was a
contractual obligation between Jared Andrus and Northwestern Mutual, with the proceeds
to be paid to the beneficiaries outside of the insured's estate. The policy was a term life
insurance policy with no cash value and a $500,000 death benefit. There was no need for
a conservator in the present case because Jared Andrus' estate, which included only
personal property and limited home equity, was valued at $9,000. The $500,000 death
benefit could not have been managed by a conservator because it had no cash value and
was payable to the beneficiaries outside the insured's estate.
Appellee's argument would be correct if the facts of this case involved an
insurance policy with a cash value of $500,000 to which the insured was entitled. In such
a case, the cash value would have been subject to the management of a conservator, who
could have sought early disbursement or loans on the cash value. Upon the insured's
death, any remaining cash value would have passed into the insured's estate. But such
was not the case here.
In sum, based on a straightforward application of Utah Code section 75-5-312(2),
the Court should conclude that Utah's statutory scheme does allow an appointing court to
grant broad authority, including the authority to change a beneficiary designation, to the
guardian of an incapacitated person.
II. The Letter of Guardianship issued to Mike Andrus by the Fifth District
Court is broad and does not limit his authority to change the beneficiary
designation.

16

Given that section 75-5-312 does empower Utah's district courts to place limits on
the powers of a court-appointed guardian, the next inquiry is whether the appointing court
placed limits on the guardian's authority in the present case. On the undisputed facts, it is
clear that the court did not.
In conjunction with the Order appointing Mike Andrus as Jared Andrus' guardian,
which Order itself contains no limits on Mike Andrus' authority as guardian, the Fifth
District Court also issued a Letter of Guardianship which states that Mike Andrus'
authority included "all the powers, authorities, rights, and responsibilities of full legal
guardianship of Jared Michael Andrus."
Specifically, the Fifth District Court found that Jared Andrus was incapacitated
(i.e., lacking "sufficient understanding and capacity to make and communicate
responsible decisions"). The court also found that Rebekah Andrus was unfit to serve as
Jared's guardian. On these findings, it should be clear that the court intended to grant
broad authority to Mike Andrus, as Jared's guardian, to make decisions for Jared and act
in his best interest.
III.

Mike Andrus was acting in Jared Andrus5 best interest in changing

the policy beneficiary.
Given the appointing court's finding regarding Rebekah Andrus in the Findings
that supported Mike Andrus' appointment as Jared's guardian (namely, that she was unfit
to serve), it is also apparent that Mike Andrus' decision to change the beneficiary was in
Jared's best interest. Prior to the guardianship appointment, Jared Andrus told his father
of the existence of the life insurance policy and expressed his desire that, should Jared die
17

from the cancer, the policy proceeds should be used to ensure a secure future, including a
college education and financial independence, for Jared's young daughter, Mary
Elizabeth Andrus. Jared also expressed his concern that the insurance funds not be
wasted on mundane living expenses. If Rebekah Andrus was unfit to serve as Jared5s
guardian due to mental and emotional instability, it stands to reason that it was in Jared's
best interest that Rebekah Andrus should be removed as the sole beneficiary of Jared's
policy and that a trust should be set up to protect a share of the proceeds for the benefit of
Jared's young child.
IV. The policy does not prohibit a court-appointed guardian from making a
beneficiary change for an incapacitated policy owner.
In the U.S. District Court, Appellee argued in her Memorandum that the insurance
policy did not allow Mike Andrus to change the beneficiary. However, the policy itself
does not expressly prohibit a guardian from making a beneficiary change if the policy
owner has become incapacitated and is under the care of a court-appointed guardian.
Where the policy addresses the manner in which the policy owner can make a beneficiary
change, but is silent on whether or not a court-appointed guardian can make such a
change on behalf of the policy owner, the court must look back to state law for guidance.
The insurer and its policy are subject to state law and cannot supercede the
provisions of Utah's statutes. In the present case, the policy states that "the Owner" may
change the beneficiaries of death proceeds while the insured is alive. While Jared Andrus
did not personally make the beneficiary change, the change was made while Jared Andrus
was alive by Jared Andrus' court-appointed guardian, acting on behalf of Jared and in his
18

best interest. Since the policy owner, Jared Andrus, was legally incapacitated at the time,
Mike Andrus, by court appointment, stood in Jared5 s place as the policy owner.
V. Mike Andrus submitted the beneficiary change form in a timely manner
under Utah law.
Appellee also argued in the U.S. District Court that Mike Andrus5 submission of
the beneficiary change form was untimely. The insurance policy language stating that a
"change of beneficiary will be made on receipt at the Home office of written request that
is acceptable to the Company55 and that the change will then "take effect as of the date it
was signed55 is vague. The most reasonable interpretation of this provision is that the
insurer will make the change once an acceptable written request is received at the home
office and that the change will be effective as of the date it was signed.
Moreover, nothing in the policy specifically requires the beneficiary change to be
submitted to the insurer prior to the insured's death. If the policy did contain such a
requirement, it would be voided by the clear terms of Utah Code section 31A-22-413(2),
which states:
An insurer may prescribe formalities to be complied with for the change of
beneficiaries, but those formalities may only be designed for the protection
of the insurer. The insurer discharges its obligation under the insurance
policy or certificate of insurance if it pays the properly designated
beneficiary unless it has actual notice of either an assignment or a change in
beneficiary designation made pursuant to Subsection (l)(b) or Section 75-2804. The insurer has actual notice if the formalities prescribed by the policy
are complied with, or if the change in beneficiary has been requested in the
form prescribed by the insurer and delivered to an agent representing the
insurer at least three days prior to payment to the earlier properly designated
beneficiary.

19

Pursuant to section 31A-22-413(2), an insurer has no obligation to pay the prior
beneficiary where a change has been requested using the proper form and delivered to an
agent at least three days prior to payment of the prior beneficiary. Applying this section
to the present case, Northwestern Mutual had no obligation under the policy to pay
Rebekah Andrus 100% of the proceeds because Mike Andrus made the beneficiary
change using the proper form and delivered the request to Northwestern more than three
days before any payment was made to Mrs. Andrus.
In re Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969 (Utah 1996), is controlling on the issue of
whether an insurer must accept a beneficiary change request that was delivered after the
insured's death in compliance with section 31A-22-413.

In Knickerbocker, the policy

owner's attorney-in-fact, acting pursuant to a power of attorney and without knowing
who the insurer was, executed a beneficiary change and gave it to his attorney, who, after
the insured's death, located the insurer and delivered the change form to the insurer. The
Utah Supreme Court ruled that the change was effective upon execution:
We find no authority prohibiting a change-of-beneficiary notice from being
effective simply because an attorney-in-fact, or even the principal, did not
know the specific name of the insurer at the time the notice was executed.
The only requirement is that the formalities prescribed by the insurance
company must be complied with, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22--413,....
Id. at 978 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court further rejected the argument that
the change of beneficiary was untimely because it was submitted after the insured's
death: "We acknowledge that the testimony shows that [the attorney] did not actually
send the notices until after [the insured's] death. However, once [the attorney-in-fact]
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signed the notices and entrusted delivery of them to [the attorney], his role was
completed, and the change of beneficiaries was effected." Id.
Applying Utah Code section 31A-22-413, as interpreted in Knickerbocker, to the
present case, the trial court should have concluded that the beneficiary change was
effective upon execution of the proper form by Mike Andrus, acting as the Owner's
guardian and in his best interest, and that Mike Andrus' delivery of the change to the
insurer after the insured's death, but more than three days before the insurer paid any
proceeds to the prior beneficiary, was not untimely.
VI. The Court erred in granting partial summary judgment based on disputed
material facts.
The trial court may also have erred by granting summary judgment for Appellee
based on disputed material facts. In his memoranda related to summary judgment and in
oral argument at the hearing on the motions for summary judge, counsel for Appellee
made multiple references to a deposition of Appellant Mike Andrus.

Use of the

deposition was disputed on the grounds that Mr. Andrus, prior to the deposition, was
promised that he would be allowed to review and correct the deposition. However, once
the deposition was taken, Mr. Andrus was not allowed to make corrections or sign the
deposition.
In oral argument at the motion hearing, counsel for Appellee referenced the
following "facts" from the objectionable deposition, which were disputed by the
Appellant:

1) that Mr. Andrus' only official action as his son's guardian was the

execution of the change of beneficiary form (Hearing Transcript, p. 6, lines 18-20), 2)
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that Mr. Andrus wanted control over Rebekah and Mary Andrus (Hearing Transcript, p.
10, lines 10-15), and that Rebekah Andrus paid the insurance policy premiums while her
husband was incapacitated (Hearing Transcript, p. 11, lines 20-24). These references
were material to counsel's argument that Mr. Andrus was acting improperly as Jared
Andrus' legal guardian.
Counsel for the Appellant objected, both in his memorandum and at oral
argument, to the references to the deposition. Hearing Transcript, p. 10, lines 16-19. The
trial court failed to act on counsel's objection and clarify that its decision was not based
on any "facts" taken from the disputed deposition. Instead, after counsel's objection, the
trial court itself referenced the disputed deposition by asserting that Jared Andrus did not
know about the beneficiary change that Mike Andrus had executed. Hearing Transcript,
p. 24, lines 1-3.
The trial court did not make specific findings of the undisputed material facts upon
which it relied in granting partial summary judgment for the Appellee. Thus, it is
impossible to know which facts the court relied on in entering judgment. As such, the
judgment should be reversed and remanded for the entry of the undisputed material facts
or, if the court did rely on disputed material facts, for trial on the disputed facts.
Conclusion
This court should reverse the trial court's decision to grant the Appellee's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment and instead should enter judgment for the Appellant, on
the grounds that, on the undisputed facts and as a matter of law, Mike Andrus had
statutory and court-appointed authority, as Jared Andrus' guardian, to execute a
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beneficiary change (which designated Rebekah Andrus as the beneficiary of 15% of the
proceeds and the Mary Elizabeth Andrus Nevada Trust as the beneficiary of the
remaining 85%) on behalf of Jared Andrus and did so in a proper and timely manner.
In the alternative, this court should reverse and remand with direction to the trial
court to make specific findings of the undisputed material facts upon which it relied in
entering partial summary judgment or for trial of the disputed facts.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of March, 2010.

.WuVvuz;
»
Larfy^Vt. Meyer?
Counsel for Appellant Walter Michael Andrus

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this b
day of March, 2010, I served a copy of this
Brief on counsel for the Appellee by first class US Mail, postage prepaid, to Brady T.
Gibbs, Wrona Law Firm PC, 11650 S. State St., Suite 103, Draper, UT 84020.
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WALTER MICHAEL ANDRUS,

ORDER ON HEARING

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case Number:

080501087

THE NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Judge James L. Shumate
Defendant,
vs.
REBEKAH ANDRUS,
Cross-Claimant.

THIS MATTER, having come on regularly for hearing on the 1 st day of
September, 2009 at 10:00 a.m., before the Honorable James L. Shumate, Fifth District
Judge presiding on Plaintiff's and Cross-Claimant's cross Motions for Summary
Judgment. The Petitioner, Walter Michael Andrus, was present and represented by his
counsel, Larry M. Meyers. The Cross-Claimant, Rebekah Andrus, was present and

Order on Hearing 09/03/09 11 20 a m

represented by her counsel, Brady T. Gibbs. The Court, after having reviewed the file,
having heard argument of counsel, and for good cause appearing, now order as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

That Cross-Claimant, Rebekah Andrus' partial Motion for Summary Judgment
is hereby granted.

2.

Rebekah Andrus, as the sole direct beneficiary to the proceeds of the
Northwestern Life Insurance policy No. 15843524, is entitled to one-hundred
percent of the remaining proceeds of that policy which have been paid to the
Court by the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company.

3.

The Plaintiff, Walter Andrus', Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

4.

Each party is ordered to pay their own attorney's fees and costs incurred in
this action.

5.

Upon expiration of the deadline to appeal this decision, Cross-Claimant may
motion this Court to release the proceeds of the life insurance policy.
DATED THIS 2$

day of

>S^fl

2009.

BY THE COURT:

HON. JAMES L SHUMATE
Fifth District Court Judge
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Approved as to FORM:

Larry M. Meyers
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I delivered true and correct copy(s) of the foregoing Order on Hearing to the following
party(s):
Larry M. Meyers
Larry Meyers, P.C.
P.O. Box 1146
St. George, UT 84771-1146
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Frank D. Mylar
Mylar Law, P.C.
6925 S. Union Park Center, Suite 600
Cottonwood Heights, UT 84047
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